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 Summary 
With the beginning of the new millennium, the longstanding need for 
reform of the United Nations system has gained new momentum. 
Efficiency gains and better coordination are desirable, though not sufficient 
to bring about improvement in international relations. There is need, 
therefore, to look for institutional innovations that would upgrade the 
pressing tasks of environmental and development policy in the eyes of 
national governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental 
organizations, improve the institutional setting for the negotiation and 
implementation of new agreements and action programs, and strengthen 
the action capacity of the developing countries on these matters. 
The present essay points to and elaborates the need . for global 
environmental governance with the help of a »World Environment and 
Development Organization» within the United Nations system, and 
outlines the shape it might be given. 
Keywords:  Global environmental problems, capacity building for 
development and environmental protection, UN reform, WEDO 
1  BACKGROUND 
Probably no one would award international environmental policy the label 
best practice. Climatologists, for instance, expect average global 
temperature to increase by up to 5.8°C (2001 IPCC scenario) and sea 
levels to rise on average by up to 88 cm in the 21st century; biologists 
estimate that between three and 130 plant and animal species die out day 
for day; water experts anticipate rapidly increasing water stress and water 
scarcity, etc. (cf. Brown et al. 2000, Gleick 1993, Heywood/Watson 1995, 
IPCC 1996, 2001, Lyke/Fletcher 1992, Meyers 1993, UNEP 1999). In 
view of this creeping global ecological crisis international environmental 
policy regimes have become a field on which the academie disciplines of 
international relations and development cooperation have focused their 
attention, not least with an eye to policy advice and management options.
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For some time now claims have been heard in science and politics that real 
progress can be made here only through a more or less fundamental reform 
of the system of international institutions, in particular by creating a new 
UN specialized agency. In 1998, in a policy paper the Bonn-based 
Development and Peace Foundation spoke out in favor of a new UN 
organization of this sort (Biermann/Simonis 1998). The intent of the 
present contribution is to more precisely ground a respective proposal 
before the forum of political science and development cooperation, and to 
speed up the debate. 
A biographical report on the issue of global environmental governance 
would be quite voluminous (cf. Simonis 1999). One of the best-known 
initiatives in the Anglo-Saxon literature is that advanced by Daniel C. 
Esty, who in 1994 proposed a global environment organization,   
envisioned as a counterpole to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
 
1    See  the literature reports in Biermann (1998),  Elliot (1998),  Gehring (1994),  Rittberger 
(1993), Simonis (1996a), Werksman (1996) and Young (1997). 
3 (Esty 1994a, b, 1996). Esty's type of organization would be concerned 
above all with global public goods like the oceans and the atmosphere, and 
he seems intent on endowing this agency with far-reaching competences. 
The North-South compromise reached at the 1992 Rio de Janeiro 
conference - i.e. that environment and development are inseparable - 
would, for Esty, in fact tend more to decouple "environment" from 
"development." On Esty's initiative, a "Global Environmental Governance 
Dialogue" of experts was started and has met several times in recent years. 
Meanwhile many politicians and governments also see a new body as a 
potential solution. In 1999 Renato Ruggiero, the then Executive Director of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), caused a stir by calling for a World 
Environment Organization as a counterbalance to the WTO (Ruggiero 
1999) - an unlikely initiative coming from a top-level manager in view of 
the usual inclination of bureaucracies to widen their own competences 
when in doubt. No doubt, the debate on the need to integrate environmental 
standards into the WTO regime (Helm 1996, Biermann 1998) played a role 
here. But as early as in 1998, the French President Jacques Chirac already 
joined the proponents of a world environment agency.
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Still, Germany has been the country seen as the main international 
proponent of a new UN specialized agency since Chancellor Kohl, in the 
mid-1990s, spoke out quite unexpectedly in favor of an "Environmental 
Security Council", a proposal that was followed in 1997 by the call for a 
"global umbrella organization for environmental issues, with the United 
Nations Environment Programme as its major pillar"
3, and is now, 
 
2  On November 3, 1998, President Chirac, at a congress of the World Conservation Union, 
spoke of the need for a "world authority" as an "impartial and indisputable global center for 
the evaluation of our environment" (Chirac 1998). 
3  Chancellor Kohl's statement before the 1997 special session of the UN General Assembly - 
the   "Rio-plus-five   Summit   "-   included   the   following  words:   "[...]   global   
environmental 
protection and sustainable development need a clearly audible voice at the United Nations. 
Therefore, in the short term, I think it is important that cooperation among the various 
environment organizations be significantly improved. In the medium term this should lead to 
the creation of a global umbrella organization for environmental issues, with the United 
Nations Environment Programme as a major pillar" (Deutschland 1997). This was in effect 
in 
line with the Joint Declaration of Brazil, Germany, Singapore, and South Africa of June 23, 
1997, at the same session of the UN General Assembly. 
4 hopefully, set to be further pursued by Germany's Red- Green 
government.
4 In a statement made on January 25, 1999, the environmental 
policy spokeswoman of the SPD Bundestag faction said: 
We need [...] to focus the tangled and disjointed international 
organizations and programs. UNEP [UN Environment Programme], 
CSD [Commission on Sustainable Development], and UNDP [UN 
Development Programme] should be merged to form an organization 
for sustainable development. Close links to the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and 
UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Development] should be 
aimed for as a means of preventing environmental dumping and 
achieving an environmentally sound, sustainable development in line 
with AGENDA 21 . (Quoted after: epd-Entwicklungspolitik5/99) 
The past decades, which have seen the establishment of the UN Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), have demonstrated that the 
international system is, despite its anarchic elements, capable of achieving 
progress in the task of further institutionalization (for a comprehensive 
evaluation cf. Brandt-Reports 1980 and 1983, Damrosch 1987, Douglas 
1987, Joint Inspection Unit 1995, Nyerere Report 1991, Palme Report 
1989, Reisman 1993, Rosenau 1992, South Centre 1996, Tinbergen 1976, 
Touval 1994, WCED 1987)5. The establishment of yet another UN 
specialized agency in charge of integrating existing programs and 
organizations is a prospect by no means unrealistic. But would an 
organization of this type be desirable? 
This question is interesting not only in practical but also in theoretical 
terms, in that it picks up on some significant problems with which the 
disciplines of international relations and development cooperation have 
been concerned with for decades (cf. CDP 1989, Hardin 1968, Kaul et 
 
4  The   German  Advisory   Council   on   Global   Change   in   1996   likewise   
recommended   an 
"organization for sustainable development," but without, at this juncture, spelling out any 
specifics (WBGU 1996). 
5  On the state of the internal UN reform debate, see UNSG (1998). The UN Task Force on 
Environment   and   Human   Settlements   recommended   setting   up   an   "Environmental 
Management Group" under the direction of UNEP as a means of better coordinating the 
work 
of secretariats, departments, and agencies. 
5 al. 1999, Miller 1990, Rosenau/Czempiel 1992, Runge et al. 1994, Streeten 
1989, Streeten et al. 1992). What is at issue are basic questions of 
international institutionalization that are exemplified in the dispute over the 
need for a global environmental organization - and the shape it ought to be 
given. In essence, what we find here are three different, somewhat opposed 
positions that need to be discussed in what follows: 
•  Hierarchization of international environmental policy (government). 
This position would state that we need a hierarchical organization of 
environmental    policy,    which    might    be    achieved    through    a 
sovereignty-impairing    world    environment    organization    or    an 
"environmental security council" (Section 2). 
•  Horizontal   institutionalization   (governance)   with   or   without   the 
establishment of a world environment organization as a new element. 
What these two positions have in common is that they reject, or 
regard   as   unrealistic,   any   hierarchization   of   the   international 
institutional structure in the sphere of environmental policy, though 
they  are   at  odds   on  whether  or  not  the  process   of horizontal 
institutionalization (governance) could and should be fostered by 
establishing       a      non-sovereignty-impairing      UN       specialized 
organization. The present article supports the latter position (see 
Section 3). 
In Section 4 the final shape is being outlined that might be given to such a 
non-sovereignty-impairing  UN specialized organization, which, because of 
the development-related component envisaged for it, we would wish to call 
the World Environment and Development Organization (WEDO). 
6 HlERARCHIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
(GOVERNMENT) 
Many representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have 
been complaining for years that international environmental policy lacks 
clout. The main world-environmental problem is, they say, the lacking or 
faulty implementation of environmental standards set out in international 
treaties and conference documents. In essence this is a correct statement. 
But often the right evidence is adduced to draw the wrong conclusions, and 
calls are made for surges of institutionalization, say, a "World 
Environment Organization" with a hierarchical organizational pattern and 
the power to impose sanctions on individual states, thus curtailing (to a 
certain degree) the sovereignty of all states. Such proposals give preference 
to the aspect of global government over horizontal, nonhierarchical 
organizational patterns (governance). 
In the theoretical debate this has often been termed undesirable - both by 
adherents of neorealism, who regard every form of institutionalization as 
unrealistic or unlikely (e.g. Waltz 1959, 1979), and by proponents of 
neoliberal institutionalism, who point to the possibility of governing in the 
international system on the basis of networked problem-specific regimes 
and not through sovereignty-impairing organizations (e.g. Haas et al. 1993, 
Victor et al. 1998, Young 1997). 
In the meantime, however, the experiences made with international 
environmental policy indicate that, at least in this field, any sovereignty-
impairing hierarchization would run up against strong resistance, in North 
and South alike (WCMC 1974). True, some thirteen years ago, as the 
climate debate was getting underway, some 24 countries spoke out in favor 
of a new authority for the protection of the atmosphere that would "involve 
such decision-making procedures as may be effective even if, on occasion, 
unanimous agreement has not been achieved" (The Hague Declaration 
1999). Such an authority was to have the power to impose sanctions 
against individual states or a minority of states (cf. Sands 1999). Even 
though some larger countries were involved - 
 
7 including Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, and Japan - of the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council only France was willing to sign the 
Hague Declaration. For the time being it appears unlikely that large 
developing countries like China or industrialized countries like the US 
would be prepared to acquiesce in any impairment of their sovereignty in 
matters of environmental protection. 
Some may regard as similarly unrealistic proposals on an "Environmental 
Security Council" (cf. Palmer 1992),
6 which the former German chancellor 
Kohl once mentioned, though without permitting it to develop into an 
official position. By contrast, the proposal to establish an "International 
Environmental Court" with binding jurisdiction (Fues 1997, Postiglione 
1999, Rest 1994, Zaelke/Cameron 1990) meanwhile has become a 
promising, realistic proposal. The former proposal would require at least an 
amendment of the UN Charter, which in turn would require ratification by 
two thirds of UN members as well as by the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. It seems that any extensive restrictions of national 
sovereignty are difficult or even impossible in view of the need for a 
quorum of this sort. 
There are also calls to strengthen the sanctioning options of existing 
international institutions, precisely with an eye to a world environment 
organization. Some see the WTO as a model, since under its rules 
individual countries can accuse other countries of violating the GATT (or 
other trade agreements) and force them to appear before a dispute-
settlement panel of independent trade experts, which de facto takes binding 
decisions (cf. Bhaskar/Glyn 1995, Brenton 1994, Hoffman 1989, Kenen 
1994). But a procedure of this kind would be more than difficult to transfer 
to a world environment organization. 
In the first place, there are technical reasons for not doing so. The parties 
to the WTO (the nation states) are, in general, parties to the 
 
6 Toward the end of the 1980s New Zealand proposed the establishment of an "Environmental 
Protection Council" that was likewise to be empowered to take binding decisions (General 
Debate Statement at the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 2nd October 
1989; Statement of the Honourable Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister of New Zealand). 
8 same trade agreements, which would not necessarily be the case with 
membership in a world environment organization. 
In the second place, effective dispute settlement in trade law resists 
comparison with the case of environmental law. Trade conflicts concern 
concrete, more or less transparent, and universally measurable legal acts of 
a government - be it the level of tariffs, import and export regulations, or 
technical standards for domestic manufacturing facilities. The GATT/WTO 
dispute-settlement panels are designed to prevent one country from 
creatively shaping its trade regulations with an eye to deriving unwarranted 
benefits at the expense of other countries. Even though environment-
related conflicts over the appropriateness of legal acts may occur, the 
problem posed by the global ecological crisis is in fact far more complex in 
terms of its causes and consequences. 
Many international environmental agreements entail no transparent, 
concrete obligations on states that could be as easily quantified as an 
export tariff. And even where there are measurable indicators, the 
subordinate priority given to the environment on the domestic policy 
agenda of most countries casts doubts on their willingness to implement 
decisions of dispute-settlement panels. 
Equipping a future world environment organization with powerful 
enforcement mechanisms, therefore, seems practicable only vis-a-vis those 
countries that even today see themselves faced with the threat of "eco-
imperialism", i.e. the developing countries (see Agarwal/Narain 1991, 
Miller 1995, Sachs 1993). It is precisely with regard to developing 
countries that a world environment organization with "sharp teeth" could 
prove counterproductive, however. In order to dodge the ecological 
enforcement pressure of industrialized countries, developing countries 
would either refrain from joining or fight to water down given 
environmental standards and refuse to accept any more stringent standards. 
This, of course, would be no great service to the environment. 
9 HORIZONTAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION (GOVERNANCE) 
As indicated above, a hierarchization of international environmental 
policy in the form of a sovereignty-impairing world environment 
organization is rather unrealistic. Effective international environmental 
policy seems possible only via horizontal institutionalization. Still, the 
question is whether the existing international governance structures of 
environmental policy should remain the way they are or whether there is 
need to widen them to include a new non-sovereignty-impairing world 
environment organization. 
In what follows this issue is being discussed with reference to three 
essential functions of international environmental policy that are not 
adequately performed by the existing governance structures: (1) 
coordination of the increasingly fragmented international institutional 
system, (2) the system's capacity-building and financial functions, and 
(3) implementation and further development of international 
environmental law (concern-building, improving the contractual basis).
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(1)    Better coordination  of the  international  institutional  system  by 
integrating certain of its functions into a new organization 
The international institutional system displays, first and foremost, 
shortcomings in coordination that lead to substantial costs and 
suboptimal policy outcomes (cf. Brown-Weiss 1989, Commission on 
Global Governance 1995, IPCC 1996, Jänicke et al. 1996, 
Keohane/Levy 1996, Ostrom 1991). UNEP, founded in 1972, was for a 
time a comparatively autonomous actor with a clearly defined set of 
functions. The proliferation of international environmental agreements, 
however, led to an extensive fragmentation of the system, particularly in 
that newly created convention secretariats have not been integrated into 
UNEP. This set the stage for an unfolding of strong particularist interests 
which has not proven conducive to a coordinated approach to 
7   See Haas/Keohane/Levy (1993) on the three 'c's of successful environmental regimes. A 
fourth 'c' to this model may be added: compliance management. 
10 international environmental policy. For instance, there is very little 
coordination between climate policy, biodiversity policy, and 
desertification policy (WBGU 1996 and 1999). Independent secretariats 
and advisory boards have been set up for each of these policy fields, which 
has led to de facto specialized institutions, each with an agenda of its own. 
The funding of the new environmental conventions with North-South 
relevance has in part been integrated into the World Bank in the form of 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), in part transferred to independent 
sectoral funds (Biermann/Simonis 1999). In addition, various UN 
specialized agencies (like WHO and FAO) have become active in the field 
of environmental protection, while UNEP, a relatively small organization 
of only 400 to 500 officers and (in 2001) a maegre 60 million US-dollar 
annual budget has been unable to develop a really effective standard-
setting and program-building force of its own. 
This problem has long been recognized. And attempts have been made to 
network individual organizations, programs, and offices since 1972, when 
a first coordination board was set up within the United Nations.
8  This 
board and its successors, however, failed to overcome the particularist 
interests of individual departments, programs, and convention secretariats, 
and the result has been a fragmentation of the international institutional 
system that has rendered it comparatively ineffective and inefficient. 
The ongoing debate since the 1992 Rio conference on institutional reform 
led to one more subcommission of the UN Economic and Social Council, 
the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD). Besides UNEP, the 
convention secretariats, and the relevant UN specialized agencies, the CSD 
has developed into a forum for extensive discourse, 
8 Following the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, an independent 
office, the "Environment Coordination Board", was created; it was disbanded in 1977. Since 
then the UN's environmental policy has been coordinated by the general Administrative 
Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) and in part by UNEP. Klaus Töpfer, UNEP's current 
executive director, now seems to intend to set up an "Environmental Management Group" 
under the direction of UNEP in order to be able to coordinate the work of the secretariats, 
departments, and agencies. 
11 but not one in which specific decisions are taken. It has proven not to be 
adequate to the cross-sectoral functions that many had foreseen for it. Its 
representatives include ministers responsible for development and the 
environment, but not their colleagues with the portfolios for financial, 
economic, and foreign affairs. 
In short, in the field of environmental policy the international institutional 
system has been marked by a high level of organizational fragmentation. 
This system lacks a focal point of the kind defined by, say, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
There are overlaps in the functions and duties of nearly all of these 
institutions. Coordination - if there is any - is an ad hoc affair, with 
individual signatory conferences meeting with UN organizations or among 
themselves to hammer out arrangements on coordination and cooperation. 
For this reason there appears to be an urgent need for an institutional center 
in charge of an international sustainability strategy. Just as, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, autonomous environment ministries were established at the 
national level with an eye to strengthening environmental protection, the 
goal now should be to further institutionalize the field of international 
environmental policy by setting up an independent specialized organization 
in order to minimize the particularist interests of individual programs and 
offices and limit double work, overlaps, and inconsistencies. 
It would appear both practicable and simple in organizational terms to set 
up an independent UN specialized organization with a legal personality, a 
budget, and funding sources of its own, a development which would have 
to be accompanied by (1) the dissolution and transfer of UNEP, CSD, and 
GEF, (2) an integration of the larger convention secretariats, and (3) a 
redefinition of the functions of the remaining environmental and 
developmental organizations, programs, and offices. 
12 (2)    Capacity-building   in   the   South   and  financial   and   technology 
transfers 
Several years ago the term capacity-building became a new catchword of 
development cooperation (AGENDA 21 1992, Jänicke et al. 1996). Seen 
in empirical terms, the building of capacity, particularly in developing 
countries, is apt to be one of the essential functions of environmental 
regimes as well (cf. Friedheim 1999, Keohane 1984, Keohane et al. 
1996, Korton 1990, Krasner 1983, Wapner 1997). Financial and 
technical cooperation on environmental problems nevertheless differs 
from traditional development cooperation: in particular the transfers 
effected by the Multilateral Ozone Fund (MOF) or the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) serve not only to build environmental capacities in the 
South, they also provide compensation for the full 'agreed' incremental 
costs incurred by developing countries in connection with global 
environmental policy - in accordance with the principle of the 1992 Rio 
conference on "common but differentiated responsibilities and 
capabilities" of the parties (see Biermann/Simonis  1999, Sand 1994, 
Schipulle 1997, WBGU 1999). 
This new frame of reference is mirrored in the parity-based North-South 
decision-making procedure of the GEF and the MOF as well as in the 
fact that the otherwise customary donor-recipient terminology has given 
way to the notion of "partnership." However, even here the international 
institutional system suffers from an ad hoc approach that fails to live up 
to the standards of transparency, effectiveness, and participation of those 
affected - and the need for financial and technology transfers from North 
to South. This is why the industrialized countries have agreed to refund 
developing countries for their incremental costs not only in ozone policy 
but also in climate policy, if the latter commit themselves to quantitative 
emission-reduction targets for greenhouse gases in the coming decades. 
There is a similar arrangement in the making for the future costs of 
biodiversity policy in the South (Biermann 1998: Chapters 5-7), and also 
for the transfers aimed at combating desertification as well as the 
anticipated transfer obligations aimed at 
13 limiting releases of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). Moreover, the 
future international trade in emission certificates in connection with climate 
protection (Simonis 1996) - perhaps initially in the form of the "Clean 
Development Mechanism" (CDM) decided on in Kyoto in 1997 -will 
require solid institutional underpinning. 
These new and extended functional requirements of the international 
institutional system can, however, not be met by the present institutional 
setting. 
•  A first approach would be the proliferation of further special funds 
like 
the Multilateral Ozone Fund, which was set up in 1990 specifically 
for 
this one environmental problem (cf. Benedick 1998). But any such 
further fragmentation   of the   institutional   system   would   appear 
counterproductive and should therefore be avoided. 
•  A second approach would be to transfer all these tasks of global 
environmental protection  to  the   World Bank.   This  the  developing 
countries would, in all likelihood, resist, since they regard the World 
Bank, with its contribution-dependent decision-making procedure, as 
heavily dominated by the North. 
•  A third approach would be to transfer the task of improving the 
capacity-building,   funding,    and    compensation   functions    of   
the 
international institutional system through an independent 
organization 
that pays   more   attention   to   the   special   needs   of international 
environmental policy than does the World Bank and is at the same 
time capable of overcoming the system's fragmentation (in more 
detail 
further below). 
As far as funding is concerned, a new world organization would also offer 
the possibility to fundamentally revamp the international system, viz. to 
introduce "quasi-automatic funding mechanisms." Nearly all funding 
mechanisms that have been used to date suffer from the voluntary nature of 
contributions, and even in cases in which there are contractually fixed 
membership contributions, payments often are politically instrumentalized 
or made conditional on the given economic situation. 
14 As the theory of collective goods indicates, the funding of community 
tasks is systematically undercut by free riders, and in consequence at the 
national level community tasks are not funded on a voluntary basis but 
financed through taxes.
9 This is the point of departure of the ongoing 
debate on quasi-automatic funding mechanisms in international 
environmental policy. 
The financial needs of environmental policy are obviously substantial. The 
secretariat of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
estimated that the conference's action program "AGENDA 21"- which was 
worked out by mutual consent of the parties to the conference - would 
require a total annual volume of 125 billion US$ in financial aid to the 
developing countries, a volume in dimensions higher than the current two-
billion budget of the GEF, through which the industrialized countries 
transfer their support for climate, biodiversity, and marine-protection 
policies in the South. 
Since early on in the debate, international taxes on environmentally 
harmful activities have been discussed as regards ozone policy (CFC tax) 
and climate policy (carbon tax). At present the debate revolves around the 
Tobin tax on foreign-exchange transactions, as well as an international 
charge on air traffic and sea transport (cf. German Advisory Council on 
Global Change 2002). The latter possibility had been addressed by former 
UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali as early as 1992 in the Agenda for 
Peace as a means of funding peacekeeping activities (UNSG 1992). Since 
collecting an international charge on air traffic or sea transport would not 
entail undue verification costs (it could, for instance, be collected together 
with the customary airport or harbor tax), it would appear practicable. A 
comparatively low tax rate may ensure that it would not result in any major 
distortions of competition and rerouting or relocation of air traffic and sea 
transport. 
9 See also the report of "The Independent Working Group on the Future of the United 
Nations", headed by former Pakistani prime minister Moeen Qureshi and former German 
president Richard von Weizsäcker (1995). 
15 An additional source of funding might be sought in a rededication of debt 
instruments from developing countries for use by the new organization (a 
global debt-for-natare swap, as it were) as well as a dedicated use of the 
possible revenues from the planned trade in emission certificates provided 
for in the "Kyoto Protocol". 
Of course, such quasi-automatic funding mechanisms could also be 
introduced without any global environment organization, just as it would be 
possible to establish a global organization without endowing it with 
automatic funding mechanisms. Still, the one is linked to the other: quasi-
automatic funding mechanisms require an appropriate institutional 
structure, and it is precisely in the case of environment-related taxes that a 
UN organization would be an actor particularly well suited to the task of a 
fair collection and administration of the funds. By the same token, quasi-
automatic funding mechanisms would provide the new organization with 
the means it needs to discharge its tasks, in particular capacity-building in 
developing countries (for more on this see below). 
(3)    Implementation and further development of international environ-
mental law 
As discussed above, it might be a mistake to think in terms of equipping a 
world environment organization with strong enforcement mechanisms (for 
the case of an International Court of the Environment, however, see 
Postiglione 1999, Rest 1994, Rosbaud / Trifterer 2000). Instead, the 
organization should have softer enforcement mechanisms, particularly the 
right to collect, evaluate, and publish in a suitable form information on the 
state of the environment and on the state of environmental policy in the UN 
member states, especially with regard to the international commitments 
assumed by individual states. As Marc A. Levy (1993) showed with 
reference to the European clean-air regime, transparent and comparative 
information on individual countries (the "leaders") can give rise to 
important political initiatives in less ecology-minded countries (the 
"laggards"). 
16 Like most other specialized agencies of the United Nations, a world 
environment organization should therefore foster problem consciousness 
and seek to improve the state of the world's knowledge, including 
information on the earth system as well as information on the state of 
implementation of international and national policy with a view to 
controlling global change (see Schellnhuber/Wenzel 1998). Of course, it is 
not necessary to reinvent the wheel: all recent environmental conventions 
have obliged the parties to report regularly on their policy-related 
activities. Specialized organizations like the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), or 
the World Health Organization (WHO) collect and disseminate valuable 
information and promote further research; the CSD provides important 
contributions in designing indicators of sustainable development. And 
UNEP, not least, is active in many of these areas. 
Yet, what we still lack is a comprehensive coordination, focusing, and 
decision-oriented processing of this knowledge. The data and programs 
currently elaborated by various international actors is in need of a focal 
point in the institutional system. In theory, UNEP could be this focal point, 
but the present resources and competences of this program, which operates 
under the UN General Assembly, are just not adequate. This would be 
more a task for a world environment organization endowed with sufficient 
funds and independent in institutional terms. 
Such an organization would also have more possibilities to support regime-
building processes ("improving the contractual basis"; see Haas et al. 
1993), particularly by initiating and preparing international treaties. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) might serve as a model here. 
Using a predefined procedure, it has worked out a body of "ILO 
conventions" which constitute a kind of global labor code. Compared with 
the ILO, however, environmental policy is, in terms of regime formation, 
far more disparate and marked by competence-related disputes between 
various UN specialized agencies in which UNEP has been unable to hold 
its own. 
17 OUTLINE   OF   A   "WORLD   ENVIRONMENT   AND   DEVELOPMENT 
ORGANIZATION" (WEDO) 
In conclusion, establishing a non-sovereignty-impairing world environment 
organization as an added element of a horizontally organized governance 
structure in environmental policy would thus appear to be a promising 
endeavour. An organization of this sort could be set up - independently of 
UN quorums - at a diplomatic conference and come into force for its 
members only. In legal terms it could even become active without China 
(as the WTO did) or without the United States (which has pulled out of 
several specialized UN organi2ations). 
In essence, the new organization should fulfill the three above-named 
functions, i.e.: (a) integrate and better coordinate international 
environmental policy, (b) build and finance capacities in the developing 
countries, and (c) contribute to a better implementation and further 
development of international environmental law. 
But what concrete shape could, should be given to such an organization? 
Here, some light needs to be thrown on three problems: (1) the 
demarcation of "environment" and "development", (2) the decision-making 
procedure, and (3) the integration of private actors into global governance. 
(1)    Demarcation of "environment" and "development" 
The main reason why a new UN specialized organization appears to be 
needed is the dysfunctional fragmentation of the international institutional 
system in the field of environmental policy. This is where the focus of its 
functions should lie. But internationally it is nonetheless important not to 
view environmental protection in isolation. Political agreements and 
programs, for instance on regulating the consumption of fossil fuels (the 
Climate Convention) or protecting tropical forests (the Biodiversity 
Convention),  inevitably affect core economic and development-related 
issues. A world environment organization must 
 
18 take this into account. It need not foster development as such, as is 
attempted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), but it must not 
run counter to development, either. Its policy should ensure that poverty 
alleviation and economic development in the South are not jeopardized 
and that international environmental policy gets in line with the criterion 
of a globally equitable burden-sharing. This is why it seems essential 
that this - as in the case of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development - should be fully reflected in the organization's name: 
"World Environment and Development Organization (WEDOf. 
Some might ask for a higher level of integration here: the amalgamation 
of UNEP and UNDP - which, in view of UNEP's small and UNDP's 
large budget, would amount to a strong union in the family of 
international institutions. Most industrialized countries have long been 
opposed to any international organization for development issues. On 
the other hand, many industrialized countries might come to like a 
UNDP-UNEP synthesis, if this proved to be a way to cut the UN's 
overall development-related budget expenditures, i.e. if amalgamation 
means savings. The former UNDP administrator, James Gustave Speth, 
called in principle for a world environment organization, though he 
spoke out against any amalgamation with his own organization (Speth 
1996, 1998)
10. One main problem is the project character of UNDP's 
work which is different from UNEP's structure. Another factor is the 
size difference between UNEP and UNDP. Both aspects might well 
hobble the policy-stimulating and cooperation-fostering effects of a new 
organization. 
 
10 "I think it is very timely to be thinking about how to strengthen the UN in both environment 
and development, and linking the two. Major institutional innovations are needed in the 
environmental area, but perhaps the most important is to dramatically strengthen the UN 
Environment Programme. My own view is that UNEP should evolve into a world 
environment organization. I think a new name might be useful, because it would symbolize 
the fact that something new had come into being. The organization which I think is needed 
is one that would deal with information, analysis, monitoring trends in environment, early 
warning, framing agreements and building consensus for action. So we need a World 
Organization for Environment that is as strong and as effective as the World Trade 
Organization, where the trade ministers work together internationally, or as the World 
Health Organization, where the health ministers work together. We need an organization 
that brings all the environmental ministers of the world together for concerted action. I hope 
that UNEP can evolve into a world environment institution of the type that I described." 
(Speth 1998) 
19 Still, even if it would, at present, be more wise to refrain from 
amalgamating UNEP and UNDP to form the new organization, it would all 
the same be necessary to add the term development to the title of the new 
organization. The double, integrative term "environment and development" 
picks up on the 1992 Rio conference and the Rio Declaration, illustrating 
that environmental policy implies no structural restraints on the economic 
development of the South. 
This in turn would imply inclusion of a number of principles of 
international environmental policy, such as the "common but differentiated 
responsibilities and capabilities" of the parties, the principle of obligations 
differentiated between North and South, and the principle of solidarity and 
compensation for the South's incremental environmental costs. So even if a 
pure "World Environment Organization" would at present be rejected by 
most of the developing countries, the proposal for a World Environment 
and Development Organization might, hopefully, open the door to a 
consensus between North and South. 
(2)    Decision-making procedure 
Institutions in general lower the transaction costs of the international 
system by providing adequate decision-making procedures (Keohane 
1984). A World Environment and Development Organization could thus 
contribute to coming to terms with the power configurations specific to 
environmental policy by establishing a unique decision-making process 
which would, independently of individual regimes, initiate and coordinate 
an international sustainability strategy of North and South. In many 
international organizations special tasks and problems have led to rather 
specific decision-making procedures. Various elements of these different 
procedures could uniquely be combined for a World Environment and 
Development Organization in order to ensure its overall effectiveness and 
acceptance. 
Decision-making procedures would certainly be appropriate that provide 
North and South with equal rights. This could prove to be a 
 
20 means of ensuring that the decisions taken by the new world 
organization on its strategy and program were compatible with the 
interests of both the developing countries and the industrialized 
countries. Decision-making procedures based on North-South parity are, 
in essence, a "third way" between the South-oriented decision-making 
procedure of the UN General Assembly (one country, one vote) and the 
North-oriented procedure of the Bretton Woods institutions (one dollar, 
one vote). 
As early as 1990 it was stipulated for the ozone regime and the 
Multilateral Ozone Fund (MOF) that every decision taken should 
require a two-thirds vote of the parties, including a simple majority of 
the developing countries and a simple majority of the industrialized 
countries (Benedick 1998). The procedure adopted for the reformed 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1994 is in effect similar.
11 
One tricky aspect of strictly parity-based procedures, however, is the 
definition of group association. Singapore, for instance, has a higher per 
capita income than many industrialized countries, though it - as a 
member of the "Group of 77" - continues to be regarded as a developing 
country. The ozone regime is marked by a problem-specific graduation 
procedure: If a developing country consumes more than 300 grams of 
CFCs per capita and annum, it is classified as an industrialized country. 
It is then required to meet the North's stricter reduction criteria and is 
included in the group of the industrialized countries in parity-based votes 
(Biermann 1998: Chapter 5). A case-specific graduation of this kind 
would, however, not seem to be appropriate for a World Environment 
and Development Organization which is to be responsible for a whole 
complex of environmental problems. A second-best option would be the 
self-definition of the parties, as in the case of UNCTAD or the UN 
General Assembly; developing countries that join 
11 Since 1994 decisions of the GEF Administrative Council have required a two-thirds 
majority that must be made up of 60 percent of the countries participating in the facility and 
60 percent of the financial contributions to the facility. This is in effect a procedure based on 
North-South parity, one that accords an effective veto to developing countries and 
industrialized countries alike. 
21 the OECD (as Mexico and South-Korea did a few years ago) for instance 
are expected to comply with the environmental obligations of the 
industrialized countries. 
In addition it would need considering to what extent a parity-based North-
South procedure could be broken down into a multiple-parity procedure. If, 
for instance, four groups - "industrialized countries" (with a temporary 
subgroup of "countries in transition"), "newly industrial countries", 
"developing countries," and "least developed countries" were formed, it 
would be practicable to base decisions of the World Environment and 
Development Organization on consent of the majority of the members of 
these four groups. 
(3)    Integration of private actors 
The ongoing discussion on global governance has focused on the new role 
of nongovernmental actors, on civil society and, in the present context, on 
transnational environmental and business organizations (e.g. 
Anheier/Salamon 1998, Union of International Associations 1999, Wapner 
1997, Werksman 1996). These NGOs not only exert considerable pressure 
on politics, they also offer a number of "services" in the international 
system: They may supply favorably priced research and policy advice by 
qualified and (privately funded) staff members, monitor the mutual 
obligations of countries in a way that would be impossible for government 
agencies due to the ban on intervention under international law, and they 
do inform governments and the public on international negotiations, both 
on the activities of "one's own" diplomats and on those of the other 
negotiating parties. In addition, transnational environmental and business 
organizations can constitute effective feedback mechanisms between 
government representatives at diplomatic conferences and the situation at 
home (Raustiala 1997). For these reasons it is widely accepted that NGOs 
should be granted a greater say in international negotiations and policy 
formulation. 
22 However, there are two troublesome areas that encumber the international 
community of private actors. On the one hand, the private environment 
groups active at UN conferences and signatory conferences are dominated 
by organizations of the North, from which they obtain their funding and, 
for the most part, their personnel (for a critical view, see South Centre 
1996: 212ff.). This may influence the agendas of these groups, even though 
attempts are often made to maintain modes of North-South parity in the 
internal coordination between transnational environmental and 
developmental organizations. When the hearing rights of such 
organizations at diplomatic conferences are at issue, it is mostly the 
governments of the developing countries that prevent any further-reaching 
rights for private actors (in part due to internal democracy deficits). A 
second problem is that the financial power of the business organizations 
may decisively dilute genuine environmental interests. 
One possible solution to these problems would be to institutionalize the 
collaboration of private actors in such a way as to ensure that the votes of 
North and South and business and environmental interests are balanced. A 
precedent here is the decision-making procedure of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) which accords four votes to every member 
state, two to the government and one each to the busines associations and 
the labor unions. The environmental and developmental organizations 
from the South would accordingly have a voting majority in the new 
organization (keyed to the size of the population they represent), and the 
interests of industry and ecology would be equally represented. 
Certain problems could emerge in transferring this procedure to the new 
organization, however. In environmental and developmental affairs there 
are few organizations that fully represent their overall national clientele. 
But effective coalitions could very well emerge in the near future - indeed, 
this could be promoted by anchoring a representation of voting NGOs 
from both camps in the statute of the new World Environment and 
Development Organization. 
23 CONCLUSIONS 
If we are to achieve an international environmental and developmental 
policy capable of ensuring sustainability in and for the 21st century, it will 
be necessary to widen the family of UN specialized organizations and to 
include a new member responsible for the policy field of sustainable 
development. Disparate, poorly coordinated units in the existing 
international institutional system could in this way be fused and on the 
whole invigorated. 
As was proposed above, the UN Environment Programme, the UN 
Commission for Sustainable Development, the Global Environment 
Facility, the secretariats of the major environmental conventions (such as 
climate, biodiversity, desertification convention and the law of the seas) 
and the UN Development Programme should be amalgamated in a new 
organization, the World Environment and Development Organization. Such 
an organization could lend the urgent tasks of environmental and 
developmental policy more weight among national governments, 
international organizations, and private actors alike. In addition, this would 
make it possible to strengthen the action capacity of the developing 
countries through enlarged financial and technical support. And 
furthermore, this would enable the international community to improve the 
institutional setting for negotiating new agreements and action programs, 
and for implementing existing ones. 
A World Environment and Development Organization could on the one 
hand be funded through contributions from the industrialized countries, 
and the savings effected by integrating existing programs and convention 
secretariats into it. A second approach to funding would be to rededicate 
debt instruments of the developing countries for the purposes of the new 
organization (enlarged debt-for sustainable development swaps). A third 
and major approach would be to introduce quasi-automatic funding 
mechanisms, above all a Tobin tax on cross-border financial transactions 
and/or an international air-traffic and sea-transport charge,   
and to harness (parts of) the revenues stemming 
 
24 from the planned trade in emission certificates in international climate 
policy. 
As regards decision-making, the World Environment and Development 
Organization could gain the largest possible acceptance by introducing a 
parity-based North-South decision-making procedure conceived along the 
lines of the Multilateral Ozone Fund (MOF) and the reformed Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). This would mean that both a majority of the 
developing countries and a majority of the industrialized countries would 
have a group veto on decisions. Furthermore, the growing influence of 
private actors in global governance should be institutionalized in the 
organization, in this way improving equal opportunity. One may, therefore, 
propose voting rights for representatives of environment and business 
organizations on the model of the ILO. In this way, every country would 
have four votes: two for the government, one for environmental and 
developmental organizations, and one for business associations. 
No doubt, an organization of this sort will seem unrealistic or untimely to 
many people. But the establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(ICC) also appeared unrealistic just ten years ago. In the present essay 
arguments were put forward that do justify the need for a World 
 
Environment and Development Organization. At least some of the 
industrialized countries like France, Germany, and Japan now appear to 
embrace a positive attitude toward a new UN specialized organization. 
Thus far the developing countries tend to be either silent or more or less 
skeptical. But the organization outlined above could soon prove acceptable 
for a larger group of countries, not least as an institutional outcome of ,,Rio 
+10". 
Representatives of the South may ask whether a World Environment and 
Development Organization should be preferred or whether a global 
environment organization of Daniel Esty's type would turn out to be more 
suitable. The present author, of course, is inclined to believe that the 
proposal advanced here has the best chance to be implemented. 
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